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MUCH ADO ABOUT NEWSGATHERING: PERSONAL PRIVACY,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES FOR ANTI-PAPARAZZI LEGISLATION
ANDREW D. MORTONt
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dan-
gers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.
I
INTRODUCTION: BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITH
LEGITIMATE LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEILLANCE
Horror, not humor, brought actors Michael J. Fox and Paul Reiser to
testify before a hearing of the United States House Judiciary Committee last
summer.2 Fox described the "mercenary tactics of tabloid photographers"
who turned his wedding into a "nightmare" as helicopters recklessly jock-
eyed for position above the ceremony, then "fired away with high-powered
cameras" on the couple's honeymoon suite.3 When Reiser's son was born
prematurely, disguised journalists infiltrated the hospital with hidden cam-
eras to steal a photo of the infant, and after returning home, the child was
photographed in the privacy of the family's backyard by "resourceful" jour-
t B.A. 1991, M.P.P. Candidate 2000, University of Maryland; J.D. Candidate 2000, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Alan Rubinstein-
gifted attorney, and the father-in-law I have known only through the many whose lives he
touched. I am deeply indebted to Ed Pease, Diana Schacht, the staff and members of the U.S.
House Judiciary Committee, Wendy Wiseman, and Allison Booth for the opportunity to be-
come educated about this issue; to Professors Edwin Baker, Pamela Harris, Seth Kreimer, and
David Rudovsky for their ungrudging assistance in developing the argument; to the members
of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, who are singularly responsible for transform-
ing an extremely rough draft into the essay that follows; and especially to my wife Karen,
whose continuous encouragement and support for doing what I love has led me to study the
law.
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 See Protection from Personal Intrusion Act & Privacy Protection Act of 1998: Hearing
on H.R. 2448 & H. 3224 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998),
available in Testimony Presented to Full Committee on the Judiciary (last modified May 4,
1999) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/l.htm> [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2448].
3 Hearing on H.R. 2448 (statement of Michael J. Fox, actor), available in 05/21/98
Committee on the Judiciary-Fox Statement (last modified May 21, 1998) <http'//www.
house.gov/judiciary/10142.htm>.
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nalists with telescopic lenses, and "strangers with video cameras camped
outside.
'A
In response to the perception that such newsgathering activities have
become unacceptably intrusive, legislators on both the federal and state
level have devised an innovative solution to supplement existing tort liabil-
ity for invasions of privacy-liability stemming from the use of "enhance-
ment devices." Such devices include zoom lenses or high-powered micro-
phones, which enable the observer to capture an image from distances not
possible without the sophisticated surveillance technology.5 By essentially
extending the common law notions of trespass, the legislative proposals
would impose liability for observations that violate an individual's "reason-
able expectation of privacy"6 as defined by evolving societal norms.7
Despite these worthy efforts to recognize and codify the importance of
an individual right to privacy, society maintains a legitimate countervailing
interest in the reasonable efficacy of law enforcement. Each legislative ap-
proach thus contains a specific exemption from liability for surveillance by
state law enforcement officials. Hence, although ostensibly drafted to apply
as a statute of general application to anyone who might disrespect personal
privacy through the use of enhanced photography or voice recordings, sub-
sections in the legislative text of both congressional bills9 and a California
statute imposing liability for unwelcome enhanced surveillance 0 expressly
exempt law enforcement surveillance.
4 Hearing on HA. 2448 (statement of Paul Reiser, actor), available in 05/21/98 Commit-
tee on the Judiciary-Reiser Statement (last modified May 21, 1998) <http: lwww.house.gov/
judiciary/10143.htm>.
5 See infra notes 97-123 and accompanying text.
6 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7 See infira notes 103, 107, 111, 120 and accompanying text (noting the "expectation of
privacy" element in the text of each legislative proposal).
8 By exposing any individual, rather than simply media representatives, to liability, the
federal bills and a California state imposing liability for unwelcome enhanced surveillance
statute seemingly avoid a determination of facial unconstitutionality based upon equal protec-
tion violations. See in.fra notes 107-23 for a discussion of this legislation. Nevertheless, op-
ponents of the legislation maintain that, although not specifically applying to professional
journalists, heightened liability against intrusion effectively could function as a prior restraint
in violation of the First Amendment freedom of the press. See Ethan E. Litwin, Note, The
Investigative Reporter's Freedom and Responsibility: Reconciling Freedom of the Press with
Privacy Rights, 86 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1096 n.23 (1998) (suggesting that "a prior restraint on
publication might be masquerading as a benign limitation on newsgathering").
9 See S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 3(g) (1998) ("The prohibitions of this section do not apply
with respect to official law enforcement activities."); H.R. 4425, 105th Cong. § 2(g) (1998)
(same); infra notes 107-23 (discussing the congressional legislative proposals).
10 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.8(f) (West Supp. 1999).
This section shall not be construed to impair or limit any otherwise lawful activities
of law enforcement personnel or employees or governmental agencies ... who, in
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What these law enforcement exemptions fail to recognize is that, prag-
matically speaking, an individual's conception of what constitutes a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" against police surveillance should parallel
her "reasonable expectation of privacy" against observation from newsgath-
ering activities of the media. Consequently, these legislative efforts to ex-
pand the zone of privacy with respect to intrusions from private actors, such
as representatives of the media, cannot be accomplished without imposing
the same restrictions on state actors engaged in law enforcement activities.
Simply put, the identical test for creating liability for offensive surveillance,
regardless of the affiliation of the offender, in practice must carry the same
legal meaning.
This Comment argues that by invoking the precise language of the Su-
preme Court's Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
to trigger liability, the legislative responses to overaggressive newsgathering
by the paparazzi inevitably will be limited in application, or, in the altema-
tive, will restructure and narrow the scope of permissible law enforcement
surveillance activity as defined by contemporary Fourth Amendment doc-
trine. To that end, this Comment first provides a summary of the judicial,
legislative, and constitutional efforts to codify the right of personal privacy
in American law. Additionally, the discussion chronicles the tension be-
tween the individual right to privacy and the First Amendment freedom of
the press. In particular, Part I of the analysis examines the various congres-
sional proposals" and a recently enacted California statute12 purporting to
address the intrusive and aggressive newsgathering tactics of some members
of the media.
Part II offers a historical discussion of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence and the scope of legitimate law enforcement surveillance that does
not rise to the level of a "search," which triggers Fourth Amendment review
and requirements. Specifically, the analysis examines the development of
the modem judicial application of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test to determine the presence of a Fourth Amendment search, as first ar-
ticulated by Justice Harlan more than thirty years ago in the seminal case of
Katz v. United States.13
the course and scope of their employment,... attempt to capture any type of visual
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of a person during an investi-
gation, surveillance, or monitoring ....
Id.; see also infra notes 101-06 (discussing the California legislation).
11 See infra notes 107-23 (discussing the congressional legislative proposals).
12 See infra notes 101-06 (discussing the California legislation).
13 389 U.S. 347,360-62 (1967) (Harlan, L, concurring).
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Finally, Part III integrates the Fourth Amendment "search" analysis
with legislative efforts to expand the scope of personal privacy, illustrating
the unintended consequences of either limiting the applicable scope of these
legislative efforts to curb paparazzi newsgathering, or restricting permissi-
ble warrantless surveillance activity by law enforcement agents. The Com-
ment concludes that the law enforcement exemption provisions contained in
the California privacy protection law and congressional proposals funda-
mentally are at odds with contemporary Fourth Amendment "search" analy-
sis. Because both the legislative text of the intrusion offense and the judi-
cial language of the constitutional search test employ the same "reasonable
expectation of privacy" element, an evolving interpretation of one necessar-
ily must affect the judicial application of the other. In the end, these legis-
lative attempts to sequester an expanded zone of privacy from surveillance
by state officials likely will result in unintended consequences for either
proponents of the legislation, or for members of law enforcement engaged
in warrantless surveillance activity.
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN LAW TRADITIONS
Over one hundred years ago, in perhaps the most renowned and cited of
all law review articles, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis set out to estab-
lish a common law protection for the right to privacy. 14 This century has
witnessed volumes of literature on this subject, each creating subtle nuances
and unique iterations for defining the precise scope and origin of the right.
Many scholars have chosen to wax philosophical, precluding any semblance
of a consensus regarding the legal nature of the right to privacy initially
contemplated by Warren and Brandeis.
15
In the midst of this academic debate surrounding the legal state of pri-
vacy rights, and catalyzed by recent events such as the tragic death of Prin-
cess Diana while in flight from paparazzi16 photographers, a legislative ef-
fort is underway to promulgate and enforce laws to restrict offensive,
14 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890) (discussing whether existing law afforded a principle which could be invoked to
protect individual privacy).
15 See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1339
("Commentators have stumbled over privacy, and have failed to agree upon an acceptable
definition, because they have generally focused on privacy as a philosophical or moral con-
cept-which allows for multiplicitous definitions. . .-while wholly ignoring privacy as a
legal concept.").
16 The American Heritage Dictionary defines a papara3zi journalist as a "reporter or
photographer, especially a free-lance one, who doggedly searches for sensational stories
about, or takes candid pictures of, celebrities for magazines and newspapers." AMERIcAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 949 (William Morris ed., 3d ed. 1981).
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intrusive newsgathering. In doing so, the legislatures-federal and state-
are endeavoring to force outward the zone of personal privacy protection
enjoyed by private citizens by enhancing civil and criminal liability against
those engaging in offensive surveillance activities.
Since 1996, anti-paparazzi legislation has been introduced in both
chambers of Congress, 17 and in September, 1998, California became the
first state to enact a law specifically targeting intrusive newsgathering by
the media.18 The fundamental motivation behind the proposal of these stat-
utes is a desire to protect individuals-particularly public figures such as
celebrities-against intrusions of personal privacy by overaggressive papa-
razzi reporting and tabloid journalism.
This Part will begin by exploring the constitutional, judicial, and legis-
lative development of privacy law, and addressing the variety of forms that
the concept of privacy can take. Next, the discussion will analyze the com-
peting interests of individual privacy rights and newsgathering activities by
the media. Finally, it will examine the congressional and state legislative
responses to the allegation that the press has emerged as a formidable threat
to individual privacy rights 19 in an age of sophisticated information technol-
ogy.
2 0
17 See H.R. 4425, 105th Cong. § I (1998) ("Personal Privacy Protection Act"); S. 2103,
105th Cong. § 1 (1998) (same); H.R. 3224, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998) ("Privacy Protection Act
of 1998"); H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997) ("Protection from Personal Intrusion Act").
is See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West Supp. 1999).
19 Regarding those in the public eye, the premonition of Warren and Brandeis in 1890
resonates with startling clarity:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has be-
come a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a pru-
rient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 196.
20 Legions of commentators have identified the proliferation of electronic communica-
tions and general technological advancements as posing the most serious threat to secured
individual privacy rights. This Comment, however, is concemed narrowly with invasions of
privacy in the personal intrusion, rather than informational, sense. For a sampling of the de-
bate over technological invasions of privacy, see ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCorr, WHO
KNOWs: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD (1997), discussing the
cumulative effect of new technologies on personal privacy; PRISCILLA M. REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995), ex-
amining various concepts and notions of privacy in public policy; GINI GRAHAM SCoTr,
MIND YOUR OWN BUSINESS: THE BATTLE FOR PERSONAL PRIvACY 343-64 (1995), ex-
plaining emerging battles for privacy in the media and Congress, at trade conferences, and
among lobbyists; and SYMPOSIUM, SURVEILLANCE, DATAvEILLANCE, AND PERSONAL
FREEDOMS: USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1973), providing an overview
of privacy-related problems in a technical era. See also, e.g., PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY
AND THE POLmCS OF INTIMATE LIFE (1996) (providing theoretical and contemporary consid-
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A. The Development of Constitutional Privacy Rights
The United States Constitution contains no express right to privacy.
Nevertheless, the medieval English common law proposition that a person's
"[h]ouse is his [c]astle" 21 has been incorporated as a central tenet of Ameri-
can legal principles since the colonial period.22 Until the late 1960s, the Su-
preme Court handed down decisions grounded in these early common law
origins in an attempt to strike a workable balance between an individual's
personal privacy interest and society's law enforcement interest in permit-
ting the detection of illegal activity. 23 Over the last thirty years, however,
the Court has begun to find a constitutionally protected right to privacy em-
bedded in an interpretation of the First,24 Third,25 Fourth," Fifth,27 and
erations for the public-private tension); DAVID F. LINOWEs, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: Is YOUR
PRIVATE LIFE IN THE PUBLIC EYE? (1989) (recommending fair information practices in deal-
ings between individuals and institutions); DECKLE MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION
(1995) (examining the history of privacy as an idea and discussing its virtues and flaws);
PANEL ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES:
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ACCESSEBILrIy OF GOVERNMENT STATISTICS (George T. Duncan et
al. eds., 1993) (reviewing the availability of statistical data maintained for governmental pur-
poses in the context of privacy considerations).
21 JOHN ADAMS, Minutes of the Review of King vs. Stewart, in I LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 127, 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
22 For extensive discussions of the early history of the "home is your castle" maxim, see
DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 85-88 (1972); SCOTT, supra
note 20, at 43; and Gormley, supra note 15, at 1358 nn. 116-19.
23 See THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY 346 (1977) ("The balance to be struck is an old one; it reflects the
tension between individual liberty and social order. The sovereign needs information to
maintain order; the individual needs to be able to protect his independence and autonomy
should the sovereign oven-each.").
24 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) ("The First Amend-
ment ... imposes limitations upon governmental abridgement of 'freedom to associate and
privacy in one's associations."' (citations omitted)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965) ("Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained
in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one ... ."); see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 64-65 (1960) (defining the right to "anonymity in public expression"); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (defining the right to "associational privacy"); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957) (defining the right to "political privacy"); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250 (1957) (same).
25 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5 ("The Third Amendment's prohibition ... protects an-
other aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 ("The
Third amendment.., prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ... is another facet
of... privacy.").
26 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 ("[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (noting that the Fourth
Amendment creates a "'right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people."' (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961))).
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Fourteenth? Amendments to supplement existing common law guardian-
ship.29 This common law and constitutional mosaic furnish the judicial bed-
rock of personal privacy rights today.
Since the early 1970s, another source of privacy rights has emerged to
augment the federal judicially and legislatively ensured minimums-the
amendment of state constitutions to incorporate a fundamental right of per-
sonal privacy.30 As suggested by Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,31 expansive protection of privacy rights on a
state level has emerged as the "laboratory" for "novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."32 Following the dra-
matic Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States,33 many states
amended their constitutions to incorporate a version of the Fourth Amend-
ment34 regarding search and seizure, with the specific intent of securing in-
dividual privacy rights for their citizens. Beginning with Hawaii in 1968,35
then Illinois in 1970,36 and South Carolina in 1971, 37 states took steps to in-
27 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5 ("To some extent, the Fifth Amendment too reflects the
Constitution's concern for... the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life." (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484
("The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.").
28 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society... and as such enforceable against the states through the [Fourteenth
Amendment] Due Process Clause.").
29 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (identifying in a plurality opinion that the "penum-
bras" of the Bill of Rights create a "zone of privacy" around the marital relationship into
which the government may not intrude).
30 For an expansive discussion charting the history and resurgence of state constitutional
privacy as a reaction to deficiencies in federal legislative and judicial privacy protection, see
Gormley, supra note 15, at 1420-31.
31 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
32 Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also infra notes 175-96 and accompanying text (discussing
the impact of Katz in the context of developments in Fourth Amendment "search" analysis).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
35 See HAW. CONST. art. , § 7 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy
shall not be violated .... ." (emphasis added)).
36 See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions
of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means."
(emphasis added)).
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clude "privacy" explicitly in the language of their constitutions. The "fun-
damental-decision privacy"3 8 cases of Griswold v. Connecticut,39 concern-
ing contraceptive privacy rights, and Roe v. Wade,40 defining abortion
rights, spurred constitutional amendments by Alaska,4' California,42 Mon-
tana,43 and Florida44 by the end of the 1970s.45 The Hawaii legislature also
built upon its search and seizure amendment and invigorated personal pri-
vacy rights with yet another privacy amendment in 19786
All told, the constitutions of ten states currently contain express provi-
sions for protecting individual privacy rights.47 Addressing the prospect of
heightened state privacy rights, the Supreme Court subsequently held that
the States are free to supplement the federally ensured minimums enumer-
37 See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable inva-
sions ofprivacy shall not be violated ... " (emphasis added)).
38 Gormley, supra note 15, at 1340. Commentators use the term "fundamental-decision
privacy" to indicate a right to personal decisions that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (identifying fundamental-decision privacy as among
five species of legal privacy). Such privacy is distinct from those privacy rights guaranteed by
the First and Fourth Amendments, state constitutions, and tort law. See id. (defining the "five
dominant species of legal privacy"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV.
737, 740 (1989) (distinguishing fundamental-decision privacy from other types of privacy).
39 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed.").
42 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, pos-
sessig, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.").
44 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.").
45 See Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for lli-
nois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 226 (arguing that "states added express protections of pri-
vacy to their constitutions between 1968 and 1980, during a period when commentators ex-
pected that the Supreme Court's privacy/autonomy cases would continue to expand the federal
protection of individual liberty").
46 See HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.").
47 The complete list of state constitutions specifically containing "privacy" or some con-
ception of the right to be let alone in their language include: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. See DARIEN
A. MCWHmTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: SEX, DRUGS,
AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 173-75 (1992) (charting the development of state constitutional pri-
vacy rights).
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ated in the Bill of Rights with respect to privacy protection.48 The Court
ruled that "[i]f the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it
is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
[state privacy] grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the deci-
sion.' A9 Thus, constitutional privacy rights appear to have found a "safe
harbor" in the domain of the states,50 given this emergence of a "New Fed-
eralism" in the last quarter century.
5'
B. Conceptions of Privacy and Existing Remedies Against Intrusion
Any attempt to articulate a precise definition of privacy mirrors Justice
Stewart's oft-ridiculed directive for identifying obscenity-you'll "know it
when [you] see it."'5 2 Warren and Brandeis suggested that the concept of
privacy embodies "the right to be let alone. 5 3 Another scholar asserted that
the notion of privacy is "related to solitude, secrecy, and autonomy, but is
not synonymous with these terms. 5 4 Others have identified their concep-
tion of privacy as "a condition of inaccessibility of the person, his or her
mental states, or information about the person to the senses or surveillance
devices of others";55 the "aspect of social order by which persons control
access to information about themselves";5 6 and "the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.
57
Whatever becomes of the theoretical conception of privacy in academic
circles, the legal conception of privacy has unfolded through the common
law into four distinct torts-intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude of an-
48 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-42 (1983) (requiring only that state courts
provide a "plain statement" when their decisions are based upon independent state law
grounds).
I49Id. at 1041.
50 Gormley, supra note 15, at 1427.
51 Id. at 1422.
52 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart
stated:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within [the definition of obscenity].., and perhaps I could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.
Id.
53 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 193.
54 DAVID H. FLAiERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIEs 8 (1989).
55 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEAsY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 15
UrCharles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968).
57 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
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other ("intrusion"), public disclosure of embarrassing private facts ("public
disclosure"), publicity that places another in a false light ("false light"), and
appropriation of another's name or likeness for one's own advantage ("ap-
propriation"). 58 Of these, journalists engaging in newsgathering activities
most likely would be exposed to liability for the tort of intrusion.5 9 The
elements of a successful claim for intrusion require that "the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person," 60 and that the act con-
stitute an infringement upon "the solitude or seclusion of another or his pri-
vate affairs." 61 Thus, the tort of intrusion provides a limited degree of pro-
tection against unwanted photography, such as where there is an attempt to
take an unauthorized photograph within the confines of an individual's
home.62 Tort law, however, generally supports the proposition that an indi-
vidual in public implicitly has consented to being photographed, and thus
legal remedies extend little protection to acts of intrusive photography,
videotaping, or surveillance of subjects located in, or in plain view from, a
public place.
63
58 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389-407 (1960) (proposing the
four-part framework for codifying tort privacy). Ultimately, this framework was adopted by
the American Law Institute in its Second Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977) (setting forth the four distinct torts for privacy invasion).
59 See Litwin, supra note 8, at 1095 (noting that "the intrusion upon seclusion
tort.., most directly affects journalists engaged in investigative newsgathering activities").
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
61 Id. § 652D (creating an offense against "one who gives publicity to a matter concern-
ing the private life of another.., if the matter publicized (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public"). Comment h to the sec-
tion illustrates that while
the home life and daily habits of a motion picture actress may be of legitimate and
reasonable interest to the public ... [t]here may be some intimate details of her life,
such as sexual relations, which even the actress is entitled to keep to herself....
The limitations... are those of common decency.
Id. cmt. h.
62 See, e.g., Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Taking Unauthorized Photographs as Inva-
sion of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3d 374, 376 (1978).
When a picture is taken of a plaintiff while he is in the privacy of his home .... the
taking of the picture may be considered an intrusion into the plaintiff's privacy ....
Of course, the courts have no trouble finding an invasion of privacy when the pho-
tographer actually enters the plaintiffs home by subterfuge, or without consent, to
take a photograph.
Id.
63 See Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986) ("The plain-
tiffs must show that there has been some aspect of their private affairs which has been in-
truded upon and does not apply to matters which occur in a public place or place otherwise
open to the public eye."); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
("[Tihis tort does not apply to matters which occur in a public place or a place otherwise open
to the public eye."); see also Hassman, supra note 62, at 375 ("Where the picture is taken on
the public streets, or in a public place such as a courtroom or a sporting event, the courts have
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Other remedies currently are available under statutory and common
law. Several states, including California and New York, have existing laws
to prohibit harassment and enable individuals to obtain injunctive relief
from press hounding. 4 Theories of harassment even can rise to the level of
intrusion, thus warranting indirect protection for violations of privacy, in-
cluding offenses that occur in public settings. 65  The most noted papa-
razzi/privacy case involved former First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,
who was granted an injunction against freelance celebrity photographer and
self-described paparazzo Ron Galella. 6  An injunction also was issued
against reporters who were gathering information for a story by engaging in
such aggressive techniques as following the plaintiffs' children to school,
videotaping their home, and using a shotgun microphone to record the
plaintiffs' conversations while within the privacy of their home.
68
Alternative common law and statutory remedies include stalking or
shadowing laws, which traditionally have been applied to the surveillance
activities of private investigators.69 In addition, the press can be held liable
refused to consider the taking as an invasion of privacy"); Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing
Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73
N.C. L. REV. 989, 991 (1995) ("As interpreted by almost all courts, the tort [of intrusion] does
not protect persons in places accessible to the public.").
64 California defines harassment as "a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at
a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses a person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b) (West 1999). It is unclear whether
newsgathering activities would fall within the statutory exception for "legitimate purpose."
Id. New York's statute provides a remedy for harassment when there is an "intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person" and "follow a person in or about a public place." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 1998).
65 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 999 (1973) (affirming the district court's injunc-
tion under the New York harassment provisions against a paparazyi photographer working in
a public setting).
66 See id. (finding the photographer's actions offensive and upholding the lower court's
injunction).
67 The Supreme Court described a shotgun microphone or "spike mike" as "a microphone
with a spike about a foot long attached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and
earphones." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent reporters from placing an individual's home under surveil-
lanced.
6 Shadowing and stalking laws are primarily concerned with cases in which a person
being watched, shadowed, or trailed has filed a personal injury suit against another who hired
a private detective to investigate the validity of a claim against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Munson
v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff's
privacy rights were not violated when the defendant shadowed him for the purpose of deter-
mining his compliance with school employee residency requirements); Johnson v. Corporate
Special Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385, 388 (Ala. 1992) (finding no invasion of privacy where
detectives investigated a worker's compensation claim against the plaintiff, because the plain-
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for false imprisonment if the targets of the newsgathering activity physically
are prevented from carrying out their intended courses of action.70 In a no-
table recent case, two photographers drove Arnold Schwarzenegger and his
wife, Maria Shriver, off the road after "swarm[ing]" around the Schwar-
zeneggers' car in order to take the first photographs of the actor following
his hospital release after elective heart surgery.71 Both photographers were
found guilty of false imprisonment; one was sentenced to sixty days and the
72other to ninety days in prison. The final alternative remedy for privacy
intrusions provides that the media can be charged with a trespass violation
where there is an unlawful physical entrance on private property. 73 These
statutes, however, generally target the persistent following and chasing by
the paparazzi, rather than the intrusive photography and recording activities
that the recent California law and congressional proposals are intended to
thwart.
74
C. Privacy and the Press: Competing First Amendment Claims
[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.
75
[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply be-
cause their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to
gather and report the news.... [T]he truthful information sought to be pub-
lished must have been lawfully acquired.
76
tiff "should have expected a reasonable amount of investigation into his physical incapabil-
ity").
See News Lite Pictures Worth Jail Time for Two, L.A. DAILY NEWs, Feb. 24, 1998, at
N2, available in 1998 WL 3851746 (noting that the Superior Court judge believed that "the
photographers had created a dangerous situation" because "[a]ny type of car chase is simply
life-threatening to those involved").
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.5 (West Supp. 1998) (characterizing entry onto pri-
vate property without the consent of the owner as a misdemeanor); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 140.5, 140.10, 140.15 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (defining criminal trespass).
The debate over curbing the paparazzi has spawned two tracks of proposed legislative
responses: the tort of "constructive trespass," see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1708.8 (West Supp.
1998); H.R. 4425, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1997), and the tort of "harass-
ment for commercial purposes," see H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3224, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 4425, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1997). See infra Part 1.D (dis-
cussing the scope of anti-paparazzi legislation).
75 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
76 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
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The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging the freedom
of the press, but this freedom is not absolute.7 7 Given the importance of in-
dividual privacy rights, "the First Amendment does not protect journalists
from liability for intruding, whether by physical or electronic means, into
the seclusion of another while gathering news."78 There is a distinction to
be drawn between legitimate newsgathering on the one hand, and unpro-
tected, tortious conduct by the media on the other.79 Although the First
Amendment protections routinely provide a powerful shield against liability
for publication,80 these protections have "never been construed to accord
newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course of
newsgathering."8' It thus is clear that the First Amendment should not be
construed as "a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means
into the precincts of another's home or office."
82
Nonetheless, a photographer's ability to take pictures in large part de-
pends upon the freedom to access places where the subject is located. In
many respects, the "right to gather information is logically antecedent and
practically necessary to any effective exercise of [the right to publish,
which] ... cannot be given full meaning unless that antecedent right is rec-
ognized. 83 As such, "liability for intrusion is not absolute, but is subject to
the limitation that the intrusion be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son." In the seminal case of New York Times Co. .v. Sullivan,5 the Su-
preme Court recognized that the First Amendment protections must afford,
to some extent, a degree of protection for information gathering as well as




78 Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Intrusion by News-Gathering Entity as Invasion
of Privacy, 69 A.L.R.4th 1059, 1065-66 (1990).
79 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not
carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.").
80 See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (distinguishing newsgathering activities
from the subsequent dissemination of captured images and recordings).
81 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,249 (9th Cir. 1971).
82 Id.
83 Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 843
(1971).
84 Raymond, supra note 78, at 1065.
85 376 U.S. 254,264-65 (1964).
86 See id. at 279 (holding that a rule permitting libel judgments against newsgatherers
would "leadf- to a comparable self-censorship"); see also Jane E. Kirtley, Vanity and Vexa-
tion: Shifting the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. & MARY BELL OF RTS. J. 1069, 1099-1106
(1996) (citing as an example of the chilling effect on journalism the decision by CBS not to
broadcast an interview with a corporate whistleblower out of fear of potential tort liability for
interfering with a contractual relationship).
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Two differing approaches have developed for Supreme Court review of
First Amendment free speech claims.8 7 Where the "communicative impact"
of speech is implicated, the regulations presumptively are unconstitutional,
such as where a particular idea or viewpoint is singled out for analysis.
88
These regulations are subject to the burden of showing either that they apply
only to unprotected speech,89 or are narrowly constructed to further a com-
pelling state interest.90 Where only the "non-communicative impact" of
speech is jeopardized, resulting in an indirect restriction on free speech, the
Court applies an ad hoe balancing test, weighing "the extent to which com-
municative activity is in fact inhibited... [in light of] the values, interests,
or rights served by enforcing the inhibition." 9' Thus, any attempt to expand
the right of personal privacy at the expense of respecting the freedom of the
press should be constitutionally suspect and subject to careful judicial scru-
tiny.92
D. Anti-Paparazzi Statutes: The Legislature Answers Back
Unsatisfied at times with the strength and scope of privacy right protec-
tion provided by the courts, the federal and state legislatures often have in-
tervened to establish and fortify areas of personal privacy protection from
intrusions by both state and private actors. 93 While constitutional limita-
tions relegate the courts to the defensive posture of resolving only the
87 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrUTIoNAL LAW § 12-2, at 791 (2d ed.
1988) (describing two paths for analyzing abridgements of speech).
88 See id. (defining viewpoint discrimination).
89 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining categories of
speech that are not subject to the protections of the First Amendment because they do not pro-
vide an "essential part of any exposition of ideas").
90 See TRIBE, supra note 87, § 12-8, at 833 (describing the compelling state interest re-
quirement).
91 Id. § 12-23, at 979.
92 See Note, Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1998)
(arguing that "although photographers should not be exempt from generally applicable laws,
laws that target photography for regulation, whether facially or in practical effect, should be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny").
93 For example, the tragic death of Princess Diana has spawned a litany of congressional
and state legislative proposals to reign in paparazzi newsgathering tactics. See infra notes
101-34 and accompanying text (detailing federal and state anti-paparazzi proposals). In addi-
tion, congressional action in the wake of the Watergate scandal led to the passage of the first
national privacy protection statute-The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88
Stat. 1896 (1974), granting an individual the right of access to information collected and used
by federal agencies. For an overview of this legislation, see Matthew N. Kleiman, Comment,
The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized Law Enforcement: A New Fight in an
Old Battle, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1169, 1183-85 (1992), discussing the scope and application of
the Privacy Act of 1974.
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"Cases" and "Controversies" that present themselves, 94 the legislatures have
moved aggressively to address deficiencies in privacy law found contrary to
the public interest. 95 In fact, of the myriad of privacy statutes in force to-
day, many are "derived from legislative dissatisfaction with the results or
pace of the judiciary's protection of privacy."
96
On the heels of the Princess Diana tragedy,97 and fueled more recently
by the perceived intrusive nature of the coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky
matter,98 legislators have introduced a series of proposals to "deter those
who would intrude upon [a citizen's] most private moments."99 Believing
that existing common law and statutory remedies provide insufficient pro-
tection, legislatures at both the federal and state levels have moved to carve
out greater protection for personal privacy rights.l00
In September 1998, then California Governor Pete Wilson signed into
law a new section of the state's Civil Code providing a statutory claim for
the common law tort of invasion of privacy. 10' To bring a successful claim
under the provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the person seeking to
capture an image or sound recording has either: (1) knowingly committed
an act of trespass in order to capture the image or sound recording, 0 2 or (2)
94 U.S. CONST. arL III, § 2 (enumerating the jurisdiction of federal courts).
95 See REGAN, supra note 20, at 5-10 (summarizing congressional activity since 1974 in
the area of privacy protection); Kleiman, supra note 93, at 1170-72 (discussing the role of the
legislature in preserving personal privacy).
96 Kleiman, supra note 93, at 1170.
97 See Howard Kurtz, Public to Press: Just Play Fair; They're Peeved by Intrusiveness
and Deception. But Are New Laws the Answer?, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1997, at B4, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (describing public anger at perceived media ex-
cesses and the various legislative responses).
98 See William Claiborne, L.A. Police Warn News Media About Pursuit of Lewinsky,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at Al (documenting the "virtual siege by news photographers and
television camera operators camped outside [the Lewinsky] home" since Lewinsky's allega-
tions against President Clinton were made public).
99 Press Release, Screen Actors Guild, Screen Actors Guild Hails Passage of California
Priva yLaw (Sept. 30, 1998).
107See S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (1998) ("[Tlechnological advances such as tele-
photo lenses and hyperbolic microphones render inadequate existing common law and State
and local regulation of such trespass and invasion of privacy."); ASSEMBLY COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REP. ON S.B. 262 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) ("Although some [paparazzi]
behavior already constitutes common law torts or criminal activity.. ., the damages [allowed
under current law] are de minimis, so there is no deterrent value to suit." (internal quotations
omitted)).
10 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1708.8 (West 1998) (creating the tort of invasion of privacy).
102
A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant knowingly
enters onto the land of another without permission or otherwise committed a tres-
pass, in order to physically invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to cap-
ture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the
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committed a "constructive invasion of privacy" by attempting to capture an
image or sound recording through the use of an enhancement device, where
the victim had a "reasonable expectation of privacy," and an actual trespass
would have been necessary without the use of the enhancement device.
10 3
Remedies for a violation include treble 104 and punitive damages, plus dis-
gorgement of any proceeds or other consideration obtained as a result of the
commercial use of the images or recordings captured.105 The section also
provides for the vicarious liability of any person who "directs, solicits, actu-
ally induces, or actually causes another person [to commit an act of trespass
or constructive trespass,]... regardless of whether there is an employer-
employee relationship."
10 6
Discontented with the narrow application of state legislative protection,
and stressing the national scope of the problem, proponents of stricter pri-
vacy protection turned their attention to Congress to enact a federal solution.
In the Senate, Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), joined
by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.), announced new legislation designed
to create enhanced civil and criminal penalties for intrusive newsgathering
activities. 10 7 Entitled the "Personal Privacy Protection Act,"10 8 the legisla-
plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion occurs
in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.
Id. § 1708.8(a).
103
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts
to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a
personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reason-
able expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory enhancing device,
regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or
other physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
Id. § 1708.8(b).
104 Treble damages consist of "the single damages found by the jury, actually tripled in
amount." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 3936 (6th ed. 1990).
105 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(c) (detailing financial liability under the law).
106 Id. § 1708.8(d).
107 See S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 4(b)(2)(A) (1998) (proposing a cause of action that mir-
rors the California statute, including the requirement that the subject have a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy with respect to the personal or familial activity captured").
108 The proposed legislation also includes a "harassment" provision which would impose
liability whenever a person "persistently physically follows or chases a person in a manner
that causes the person to have a reasonable fear of bodily injury, in order to capture by a vis-
ual or auditory recording instrument any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression of the person" and the image or recording is captured "for commercial
purposes." Id. § 3(a)(2); see also H.R. 4425, 105th Cong. § 2(a)-(b) (1998) (providing pro-
tection from personal intrusion for commercial purposes by adding a reckless endangerment
and tortious invasion of privacy cause of action to the United States Code); H.R. 3224, 105th
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tion includes the finding that the "legitimate privacy interests of individuals
and their families have been violated '10 9 by media agents who commonly
use "intrusive modem visual or auditory enhancement devices, such as
powerful telephoto lenses and hyperbolic microphones that enable invasion
of private areas that otherwise would be impossible without trespassing."
110
Like the California enactment, an element of the offense requires that the
subject of the newsgathering activity have "a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to the personal or familial activity captured.""'
Congressional jurisdiction to address the situation derives from the
Commerce Clause. 112 The proposed legislation would apply only when the
visual image or recording is: (1) found to have been, or was intended to
have been, captured for a commercial purpose and (2) sold, published, or
transmitted in interstate commerce. 113  Jurisdiction also would be estab-
lished whenever the person capturing the image or recording herself moved
in interstate commerce in order to capture the physical impression.1 4 Note,
however, that although the proposal contains a commercial purpose re-
quirement for jurisdictional reasons, no liability applies for activity involv-
ing "the sale, transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image or
recording of the type or under the circumstances described herein in any
otherwise lawful manner."" 5 Once an image or recording has been cap-
Cong. § 2(a) (1998) (providing protection from personal intrusion for commercial purposes by
creating a harassment standard); H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997) (providing a cause of
action against harassment). This aspect of the legislation falls beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, but for a discussion of the "harassment" provisions in recent legislative proposals, see
Dennis F. Hernandez, Current Developments in Privacy Litigation, 523 PLI/PAT 263, 293-95
(1998), analyzing the Federal Personal Privacy Protection Act and related California and Utah
regulations; Victor A. Kovner et al., Recent Developments in Newsgathering, Invasion of Pri-
vacy andRelated Torts, 498 PLIIPAT 539, 554-58 (1997), discussing claims against paparazzi
intrusions and uninvited ride-alongs, where a camera or other recording device captures im-
ages without the subject's permission; Note, supra note 92, at 1090-91, discussing the legisla-
tive history of the California Personal Intrusion Act.
109 S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2).
110 Id.
I I Id. § 4(b)(2)(a).
112 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several states.").
113 See S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(2) ("[A] visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression shall not be found to have been, or intended to have been, captured for
commercial purposes unless it was intended to be, or was in fact, sold, published, or transmit-
ted in interstate or foreign commerce .... ").
114 See id. (providing that an image, sound recording, or other physical impression will be
considered commercial where "the person attempting to capture such image, recording, or
impression moved in interstate or foreign commerce in order to capture such image, record-
ing, or impression").
115 Id. § 4(e).
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tured, irrespective of the manner in which it is obtained, the First Amend-
ment provides effective refuge against civil or criminal liability for its sub-
sequent treatment, 16 subject to existing common law torts such as public
disclosure, false light, or appropriation.
117
In the House of Representatives, a companion bill to the Senate meas-
ure also was introduced during the 105th Congress. 11s Sponsored by John
Conyers (D-Mich.) and Bill McCullom (R-Fla.), the House proposal creates
the offense of "tortious invasion of the privacy of another person"'1 9 when-
ever an image or sound recording is: (1) captured using an enhancement
device, (2) the subject possesses "a reasonable expectation of privacy,"'
120
and (3) the "impression could not have been captured without a trespass if
not produced by the use of the enhancement device."' 2' This bill, like the
Senate version, is careful to distinguish between the intrusive newsgathering
activities targeted, and the sale, transmission, publication, or broadcast of
the images, 122 which is specifically exempted from both civil and criminal
liability due to First Amendment concerns.
123
In an attempt to prevent deleterious effects on law enforcement, how-
ever, the federal and state legislative efforts contain a specific exemption for
surveillance activity by state actors. 124 The legislative history accompany-
116 See, e.g., In re King World Productions, Inc., 898 F.2d 56, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990)
(criticizing a television news magazine for surreptitiously videotaping the plaintiff, but va-
cating a temporary restraining order preventing broadcast of the videotape); see also
RAYMOND WACKS, PRiVACY AND PRESS FREEDOM 142 (1995) (asserting that "the intrusive
activity by which .. information is obtained must be treated distinctly from its subsequent
disclosure").
117 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Dean Prosser's four-part
framework for enforcing tort privacy).
118 Two additional anti-paparazzi bills were introduced during the 105th Congress, by
Representatives Sonny Bono (R-Cal.) and Elton Gallegly (R-Cal.), but they proposed a cause
of action only against harassment and not against trespass or constructive trespass. See H.R.
3224, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997); supra note 108 (discussing alter-
native versions of House acts that provide protection from personal intrusions for commercial
purposes).
119 H.R. 4425, 105th Cong. § 2(b) (1998).
120 Id. § 2(c)(2)(A)(i).
121 Id. § 2(c)(2)(A)(ii).
122 See id. § 2(e) ("Nothing in this section makes the sale, transmission, publication,
broadcast, or use of any image or recording of the type or under the circumstances described
in this section in any otherwise lawful manner by any person subject to criminal charge or
civil liability."); see also S. 2103, 105th Cong. § 4(0 (1998) (same).
123 Commentators proposing remedies for the intrusive newsgathering activities of the
press bifurcate their legal analysis to distinguish between the process of gathering the infor-
mation and the information's subsequent publication. See supra notes 112-16 and accompa-
nying text ("[Tihe First Amendment provides effective refuge against civil or criminal liabil-
ity for its subsequent treatment .... ).
124 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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ing the California statute, for example, states that "[a]ppropriately, [the law]
specifically excludes from its ambit legitimate law enforcement or other
governmental agency activities." 125 This is the case although contemporary
Fourth Amendment doctrine triggers constitutional scrutiny for warrantless
search activities by a public official using the very same test as the intrusion
legislation-whether the observation has encroached upon an individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Thus, taken in their entirety, the Cali-
fornia law and congressional proposals represent a legislative attempt to
thrust outward the scope of personal privacy vis-A-vis private actors, while
simultaneously resisting a broadening of this protection with respect to sur-
veillance at the hands of the state.
These congressional and state responses predictably have come under
attack from a broad range of free press advocates, including the Radio-
Television News Directors Association, 126 the National Press Photographers
Association, 127 and the American Society of Newspaper Editors. 12  Critics
assert that enacting laws to regulate the news media "would be unnecessary,
unwise, and unconstitutional," 129 and could produce "a deleterious ef-
fect.., on the newsgathering process." 130 In their view, First Amendment
free press rights to some degree must trump personal privacy expectations if
the media effectively is to serve the public interest. In the words of one
court, the "legitimate countervailing social needs may warrant some intru-
sion despite an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and freedom
from harassment."'131 Furthermore, the common law now recognizes that
"public figures have to some extent lost the right of privacy, and it is proper
to go further in dealing with their lives and public activities than with those
of entirely private persons.' 3 2 Moreover, within the domain of protection
125 ASSEMBLY COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REP. ON S.B. 262, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1998).
See Hearing on H. 2448, supra note 2 (statement of Barbara S. Cochran, President,
Radio-Television News Directors Association) ("Any attempt to regulate those who engage in
newsgathering raises compelling First Amendment concerns.").
1See id. (statement of David R. Lutman, President, National Press Photographers As-
sociation) (stating that the "primary effect [of anti-paparazzi legislation] ... will be to greatly
reduce the legitimate news gathering activities ofjoumalists who obey the law").
128 See id. (statement of Paul C. Tash, Executive Editor, St. Petersburg Times, on behalf
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors) ("This bill is unnecessary, and it reaches way
beyond the ultimately narrow problem it purports to address.").
129 Id. (statement of Paul K. McMasters, First Amendment Ombudsman, The Freedom
Forum).
130 Id. (statement of Robert D. Richards, Founding Director, Pennsylvania Center for the
First Amendment).
131 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973).
132 Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 746-47 (Ct. App. 1962)
("iThere is a public interest which attaches to people who by their accomplishments, mode of
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against surveillance, which can come at the hands of private as well as state
actors, opponents of strengthened personal privacy laws invoke First
Amendment free speech protections to support their position.
33
Notably, each of these legislative proposals, congressional and state, in-
vokes some form of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as an ele-
ment of the offense. 134  The derivation and significance of this required
element is the focus of the next two Sections.
III. THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEILLANCEI
35
A. Emergence of the Trespass Standard
The early battles pitting the rights of personal privacy against law en-
forcement surveillance emerged in the domain of wiretapping activity at the
time of Prohibition. 136 In the landmark case of Olmstead v. United States,
137
the Supreme Court determined whether evidence obtained through the
monitoring of the defendants' telephone calls contravened the Fourth
Amendment restriction on conducting warrantless searches., 3s The defen-
living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their
activities.").
133 See Gormley, supra note 15, at 1374-91. One must be careful to distinguish between
these two types-free speech and free press-of First Amendment privacy rights. See id. at
1375. In the case of free speech, this privacy is merely parasitic, "deriving its importance not
from any direct or consistent source in the Constitution, but as a counterweight... in order to
restricti] free speech under the Constitution." Id. Thus, the privacy right in question has de-
veloped not as an independent fundamental right, as is the case with the right to privacy
against unreasonable search and seizure, but as a counterweight to mitigate abuses of freedom
of speech. For example, this right to privacy may act to constrain an assertion of free speech
by a religious solicitor who wanders door-to-door in a residential neighborhood. See id. On
the other hand, collisions with freedom of the press "involve privacy as a mere
tort... enjoy[ing] no preferred status in the law." Id.
134 See supra notes 103, 111, 121 and accompanying text (detailing the specific textual
langua3ge in each proposed regulation).
For a thorough review of the status and history of Fourth Amendment analysis, see
Leslie A. Maria, Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 86 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1998).
136 Some commentators argue that the first in-depth analysis of the Fourth Amendment
by the Supreme Court occurred earlier, in the landmark case of Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886). In that case, "the Court created a hierarchy of personal property rights, with
the permissibility of a search or seizure premised on whether the government had a superior
interest in the thing to be searched or seized." Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth
Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 312
(1998). For a general discussion of the case and emergent framework, see id. at 312-16.
277 U.S. 438 (1928), rev'd on other grounds by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455 (addressing "the single question whether the use of
evidence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by
means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth... Amendmentfr').
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dants were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act, 139 and appealed on the grounds that the prosecution's case relied nearly
exclusively on evidence gathered through a wiretap of the defendants' tele-
phone lines in violation of their right to privacy embedded in the Fourth
Amendment.1 40 In holding that the government's conduct did not impugn
the defendants' constitutional protections, the Court reasoned that the intent
of the Fourth Amendment strictly was to guard against searches of a physi-
cal nature.' 4' Since the state agents inserted the wires from the basement of
an office building located on a public street and never entered the defen-
dants' property, 142 Chief Justice Taft found no textual support for invoking
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.1
43
In a portentous dissent that would prove to represent the modem incar-
nation of search and seizure jurisprudence, Justice Brandeis vehemently
objected to such a construction of the Fourth Amendment. 44 In his view,
the Founders crafted the language of the Fourth Amendment in response to
"an experience of evils" 145 that did not include or even contemplate the de-
velopment of telephones and electronic surveillance technology. 146  Fur-
thermore, just as the Founders could not have predicted the sophistication of
information gathering techniques to come in future generations, Brandeis
was deeply troubled, not only by the presence of "what has been,"'147 but by
the possibility "of what may be."'
148
139 See id. (stating that the petitioners were convicted of a conspiracy by "unlawfully pos-
sessing, transporting and importing intoxicating liquors and maintaining nuisances, and by
selling intoxicating liquors").
See id. at 482 ("The [wiretap] evidene ... constitutes the warp and woof of the gov-
ernment's case.... There is literally no other evidence of guilt on the part of some of the de-
fendants except that illegally obtained by these officers.").
141 See id. at 464 (noting that the language of the Fourth Amendment suggests that "the
search is to be of material things--the person, the house, his papers or his effects").
142 See id. at 457 ("The insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants. They were made in the basement of a large office building.").
143 See id. at 464 ("The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.").
144 See id. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, L, dissenting).
146 See id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Clauses guaranteeing to the individual
protection against specific abuses of power, must have a... capacity of adaptation to a
changing world .... Mime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and pur-
poses." (internal quotations omitted)).
"47 Id. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the pri-
vacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations between them
upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard.").
148 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The progress of science in furnishing the gov-
ernment with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day
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Over the following several decades, the Supreme Court adhered to
Olmstead's conclusion that no search or seizure occurs in the absence of a
physical trespass. In Goldman v. United States,149 the Court held that fed-
eral agents acted within constitutional guidelines when planting a dicta-
phone recording device in a partition wall to listen in on conversations tak-
ing place inside the next room, and the opinion expressly reaffirmed the
Olmstead holding. 50 In On Lee v. United States, an undercover agent
wearing a concealed microphone entered a retail store to investigate narcot-
ics violations while another agent listened in from a location outside the
building. 151 No constitutional violation was found, since the use of elec-
tronic equipment substantially resembled the permissible use of bifocals,
field glasses, or telescopes. 52 It was not until the late 1960s, in the case of
Silverman v. United States,'53 where the Court found evidence of an actual
trespass by law enforcement agents, that surveillance activity invading the
defendant's physical space was declared to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.154 In Silverman, police officers used a directional microphone,
or "spike mike,' 155 to tap into a heating duct of a row house to eavesdrop on
conversations taking place inside.156 The majority opinion by Justice Stew-
art determined that the microphone's placement in contact with the heating
duct created "the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area."'157 Thus, the majority was able to conclude that the constitu-
tional protections against unreasonable searches had been violated while
continuing to adhere to a view that evidence of a physical trespass is a nec-
essary condition for triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny.158
be developed by which the Government... will be enabled to expose to a jury the most inti-
mate occurrences of the home.").
149 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
ISO See id. at 135 (dismissing the defendant's argument that when "one talks in his own
office, and intends his conversation to be confined within the four walls of the room, he does
not intend his voice shall go beyond these walls" and holding that "no reasonable or logical
distinction can be drawn between what federal agents did in the present case and state officers
did in the Olmstead case").
151 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
152 See id. at 754 (noting that "[tjhe use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to mag-
nifty he object of a witness' vision is not a forbidden search or seizure").
153 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
154 See id. at 511 (finding the search unconstitutional because "the officers overheard the
[defendants'] conversations only by usurping part of [their] house or office").
155 See supra note 67 (noting the Supreme Court's definition of a "spike mike").
156 See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506 ("The record clearly indicates that the spike made
contact with a heating duct serving the house ...157 Id. at 512.
158 See id. ("We find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go be-
yond it, by even a fraction of an inch.").
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B. Brandeis Vindicated: The Court Adopts a Privacy Standard
While the Silverman Court refused to abandon the conception of Fourth
Amendment privacy being related to the property law conception of tres-
pass,159 the majority opinion by Justice Stewart "presaged a shift in the
Court's Fourth Amendment philosophy toward a greater solicitude for pri-
vacy flowing from the person."' 60 By the 1960s, the nation witnessed "an
explosion of national concern over gaining control over this growing ability
of the government and private investigators to snoop,' 161 which rightly
could be compared to "today's effort to protect privacy in the face of an-
other explosion of new technologies."'162 Then, in Berger v. New York, the
Court was faced with determining the constitutionality of evidence seized
through the use of a bugging device planted in a business office. 1
63
In Berger, state agents were investigating allegations that an individual
was accepting bribes in exchange for the issuance of New York State liquor
licenses. 64 Although an eavesdropping order was obtained, the majority
concluded that the provisions authorizing the order did not satisfy constitu-
tional requirements, because "the broad sweep of the statute is immediately
observable." 165 The statute conspicuously lacked any provision requiring
that "a particular crime be named.' 66 Additionally, there was no require-
ment that the order disclose a "particular description of the conversations
sought."167 Furthermore, "the length of time eavesdropping was permitted
was too extensive, ',168 extensions were granted even without proof that the
surveillance served the public interest, 169 no provision required termination
of the operation "once the evidence sought was found,"'170 and "the statute
lacked notice and return procedures." 171 The Court's opinion by Justice
159 See Gormley, supra note 15, at 1365 n.156 ("The Court found that the contact with
the heating duct constituted a physical invasion of the premises.").
160 Id. at 1365.
161 ScoTT, supra note 20, at 62.
162 Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting the threat to privacy rights
posed by sophisticated information technology).
163 388 U.S. 41,45 (1967).
164 See id. at 44-45 (summarizing the facts of the case).
165 Id. at54.
166 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 373 (5th ed. 1996).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id. (explaining that "extensions of the time period were granted on an insufficient
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Clark "recognized that no statute might satisfy its demands, but indicated its
willingness to bar much eavesdropping absent a better statute ' 172 rather than
risk exposing individual privacy rights to state-sanctioned abuses. 73 In the
view of the majority, "[b]y its very nature eavesdropping involves an intru-
sion on privacy that is broad in scope" and warrants particularly demanding
regulation.
174
The Supreme Court ushered in a new era of Fourth Amendment inquiry
with Katz v. United States, a case concerning law enforcement agents who
planted a listening device on the outside of a public telephone booth to
eavesdrop on the defendant's end of the conversation. 175 In Katz, the Court
finally rejected the longstanding view that a Fourth Amendment violation
must be coupled with a physical intrusion into "a constitutionally protected
area.' 1 76 In the Court's view, such a formulation of the issue "deflects at-
tention"177 away from a proper analysis of the question as to whether a
search has taken place, because "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."' 78 Although the Court acknowledged that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection," it became clear that "what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected."' 179 The decision expressly overruled Olin-
stead8 ' and Goldman,'8' asserting that "the reach of [the Fourth] Amend-




173 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) ("Our concern with the statute here
is whether its language permits a trespassory invasion of the home or office, by general war-
rant, contrary to the command of the Fourth Amendment. As it is written, we believe that it
does.").
% Id. at 56.
175 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that the eavesdropping ac-
tivities constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
176 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961); see also supra notes 153-58
and accompanying text (discussing the Silverman case).
177 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 351-52.
180 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see also supra notes 137-48 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Olmstead case).
81 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); see also supra notes 149-50 (dis-
cussing the Goldman case).
182Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (concluding that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling").
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In a concurrence that lower courts have come to rely on more heavily
than the majority opinion,18 3 Justice Harlan articulated his celebrated "ex-
pectation of privacy" test for defining legitimate warrantless surveillance by
electronic devices.1 84 For Harlan, the application of Fourth Amendment
protection is predicated upon a "twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' ' 185 As the case law developed, it became clear that when interpreting
the subjective prong of Justice Harlan's test, "it is not sufficient that [the
expectation] be merely reasonable; something in addition is required."
186
By way of illustration:
If two narcotics peddlers were to rely on the privacy of a desolate comer of
Central Park in the middle of the night to carry out an illegal transaction, this
would be a reasonable expectation of privacy; there would be virtually no risk
of discovery. Yet if by extraordinary good luck a patrolman were to illuminate
the desolate spot with his flashlight, the criminals would be unable to suppress
the officer's testimony as a violation of their rights under the fourth amend-
ment. This then is an example of a reasonable expectation of privacy being
upset by a patently reasonable "search.",
18 7
The justification for an individual right to privacy, then, does not derive
from an expectation based upon the statistical probability of an intrusion
occurring, which "is not really what Katz is all about"; 188 certainly the hy-
pothetical criminals in Central Park rationally considered their transaction to
involve little risk of discovery. Rather, the expectation of privacy is in-
tended "to be a basis of differentiating those expectations which are merely
reasonable from those expectations which are to be constitutionally en-
forced due to other social considerations.' ' 89 Thus, the emergent frame-
work established that "[e]xpectations of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as legitimate have, at least in theory, the greatest protection; di-
minished expectations of privacy are more easily invaded; and subjective
expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as legiti-
183 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125 (2d ed.
1992) ("Justice Harlan, concurring, elaborated the point in language which has often been re-
lied uon by lower courts in interpreting and applying Katz...
I Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
185 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
186 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 183, at 126.
187 Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 983 (1968).
188 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 183, at 126.
189 Note, supra note 187, at 983 (emphasis added).
14591999]
1460 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 147:1435
mate have no protection." 190 In the final analysis, the relevant inquiry re-
volves around "whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by
the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the
amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished
to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society."'
191
Therefore, although a literal interpretation of Justice Harlan's test requires
that the defendant have an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" to
invoke constitutional protections,1 92 the Court's further expounding of the
doctrine has clarified that the standard strictly depends upon the expecta-
tions of privacy that society deems reasonable.
93
Even more important than the narrow holding restricting the availability
of electronic surveillance by law enforcement, the concurring opinion has
evolved into a test of general application "even outside of electronic eaves-
dropping settings," 194 which fundamentally "marks a movement toward a
redefinition of the scope of the Fourth Amendment."
195
C. The Pendulum Swings Back: Implementing the
"Reasonableness" Standard
Once the Court had issued its definitive statement that the protections of
the Fourth Amendment extend to any circumstance in which the defendant
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy, this safe harbor from gov-
ernment surveillance began to shrink. In the early years following Katz, the
level of personal privacy extrapolated from the Fourth Amendment surren-
dered to "a view that used privacy analysis not to expand protected individ-
ual interests, but to reduce the scope of the amendment's protections."
196
Particularly given the rise in public concern over the rampant growth of il-
legal drug use during the 1980s, the Court engaged in a shrewd shift in
analysis197--the "expectation of privacy" test was tacitly manipulated de-
190 Clancy, supra note 136, at 331 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
191 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MMN. L. REV.
349,1403 (1974).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
193 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 183, at 126 (explaining that "the ultimate question
under Katz is a value judgment" (internal quotations omitted)).
194 Id. at 125.
195 Id.
196 Clancy, supra note 136, at 331.
197 See SCOTT, supra note 20, at 63 (noting that "as the war against drugs heated up in the
1980s, the right of privacy got... battered, as the courts gave the government and police
more leeway in searching for illegal substances, though they might not be so free in doing
other kinds of searches').
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pending upon the nature of the underlying offense. 98 As one commentator
notes, "the existence or non-existence of Fourth Amendment privacy now
appears to be dependent (to some extent) upon the subject-matter of the
case."
199
When the object of law enforcement surveillance is related to gathering
evidence for a criminal trial, the analysis of "reasonableness" has placed a
thumb on the scale in favor of the government. A line of cases over the past
decade has entrenched an analysis proving unfavorable to personal privacy
rights in this context. The 1988 Supreme Court decision in Florida v. Ri-
ley20° presents an illustrative example. In this case, a county sheriff's office
followed up on an anonymous tip regarding a marijuana-growing operation
by circling the defendant's property in a helicopter at an altitude of roughly
four-hundred feet.201 Through aerial naked-eye observations, the law en-
forcement officer peered through openings in the defendant's backyard
greenhouse and concluded that marijuana plants were present inside.
202
Based upon this information, a search warrant was issued to enter the
premises, and the defendant was charged with possession of an illegal sub-
stance under state law.203
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming that the
warrantless aerial surveillance constituted a violation of his reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy against unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment.204 The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and on ap-
peal, the Florida Supreme Court held that the helicopter surveillance from
four-hundred feet established a search for which a warrant was required.2 °5
In the view of Florida's highest court, such conduct must be assessed in
light of society's standards of reasonableness in order to be considered an
198 See Gormley, supra note 15, at 1370 ("[rjhe Court seems to be especially heavy-
handed in discounting the 'reasonableness' of the citizen's expectation of privacy where the
individual's claim to secrecy or solitude collides with the government's war on drugs and al-
cohol.').
199 Id.
200 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
201 See id. at 448 (describing the aerial investigation by the police).
202 See id. (noting that "[w]ith his naked eye, [the officer] was able to see through the
openings in the roof and one or more of the open sides of the greenhouse and to identify what
he thought was marijuana growing in the structure").
203 See id. at 448-49 ("A warrant was obtained based on these [aerial] observations, and
the ensuing search revealed marijuana growing in the greenhouse. Respondent was charged
with possession of marijuana under Florida law.").
204 See id. at 449.
205 See id. (noting that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court... reinstated the trial court's sup-
pression order").
1999] 1461
1462 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 147:1435
unacceptable intrusion into the privacy of the home.20 6 The United States
Supreme Court, however, reversed.20 7
In the majority opinion by Justice White, the Court reasoned that al-
though the defendant "no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse
would not be open to public inspection,"20 8 by leaving the sides and roof of
the structure partially open to aerial view, the contents of the greenhouse
were "subject to viewing from the air."20 9 Thus, the defendant "could not
reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or
official observation from a helicopter.., flying within the navigable air-
space for fixed-wing aircraft."2 10 The majority concluded that helicopter
flights at four-hundred feet are not "sufficiently rare in this country to lend
substance to [the defendant's] claim that he reasonably anticipated that his
greenhouse would not be subject to [aerial] observation."2 1' Accordingly, in
the Court's view, he could not possess any reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy by societal standards under the Katz search test.
212
A litany of other cases has similarly rejected Fourth Amendment
protection on the grounds that the targeted individual lacked a legit-
213 214imate2  expectation of privacy by society's standards. Professor Clancy
notes that a person has been found to lack an expectation of privacy in
the following situations: 215  when standing in the threshold of one's
206 See Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 288 (Fla. 1987) ("The fourth amendment reflects a
choice that our society should be one in which citizens 'dwell in reasonable security and free-
dom from surveillance."' (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))), rev'd
sub nom. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
207 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
208 Id. at 450.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 450-51.
211 Id. at 451-52.
212 See id. at 450-51 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy).
213 In cases since Katz, the Court has begun to substitute "legitimate" or "justifiable," for
"reasonable," in describing the expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., United States v. Jacob-
sen, 466 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1984) (holding that law enforcement officials may "seize effects
that cannot support ajustifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant, based on probable
cause to believe they contain contraband." (emphasis added and internal quotations omitted));
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) ("[A] person has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." (emphasis added)). Some
commentators claim that the distinction reflects an intention to distance the analysis from "the
statistical probability of being discovered in the circumstances," which "is not really what
Katz is all about." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 183, at 126. Others assert that "those terms
do not have a different meaning." Clancy, supra note 136, at 329 n.137.
214 See Clancy, supra note 136, at 331-34 (outlining a hierarchy of protected privacy in-
terests, based on societal standards).
215 See id. (citing examples where an expectation of privacy was found to be lacking).
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dwelling;216 regarding objects and activities in open fields or roads;217 from
the use of a specially trained drug-sniffing dog to search luggage;218 as to
observations made from aerial surveillance by an airplane,219 even within
the curtilage220 of the home;221 as to commercial property, in the areas read-
ily accessible by the public to transact business; 222 and with respect to pris-
oners while incarcerated.2 23 No legitimate expectation of privacy exists
where garbage has been left for collection,224 or where a tracking device is
216 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (finding the threshold of a
dwelling to be a public place for Fourth Amendment purposes).
217 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-81 (1984) ("[A]n individual has no
legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by govern-
ment officers."); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another.").
218 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that "exposure of [the
defendant's] luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine.., did not con-
stitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment").
219 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding an aerial
search to be beyond Fourth Amendment protection because "an industrial complex is more
comparable to an open field and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in
aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the area for the
reach of cameras").
220 For Fourth Amendment purposes, the "curtilage" includes "those outside buildings
which are intimately connected with the habitation and in proximity thereto and the land or
grounds surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and habitually used for
fami * purposes." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 104, at 384.
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (finding an aerial search of the
curtilage permissible because the police may lawfully see what may be seen "from a public
vantage point where [they have] a right to be").
See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (finding that there is no "reason-
able expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to enter and to
transact business").
22 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (noting that "given the realities of in-
stitutional confinement, any reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained neces-
sarily would be of a diminished scope").
224 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (suggesting that "[it is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are read-
ily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public," and
concluding that the defendants "could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
inculpatory items that they discarded" (citations omitted)).
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planted in goods sold to a person to monitor their location,225 at least until
the container enters the curtilage of the person's home.
226
Although the Supreme Court has yet to speak to the most recent incar-
nation of sophisticated law enforcement surveillance methods, warrantless
thermal imager scanning,227 nearly every circuit court that has ruled on this
issue has held that the technology falls beyond a person's legitimate expec-
tation of privacy. 228 Whatever decision awaits the inevitable Supreme Court
treatment with regard to thermal imager searches, the symbolic value re-
mains that the rapidly increasing sophistication of surveillance technology
has left Fourth Amendment "search" jurisprudence in an unsettled state of
flux and mutability. As explained in the discussion that follows, this high
degree of uncertainty is precisely the root of the California anti-paparazzi
law's unintended consequences.
IV. STATUTORY PRIVACY EXPANSION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT SPILLOVER
Thus far, this Comment has explored the historical developments of
remedies against intrusions of personal privacy, and of legitimate law en-
forcement surveillance in the absence of a warrant. Particular attention has
225 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) ("The mere transfer [to the de-
fendant] of a can containing an unmonitored beeper infringed no privacy interest."); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding that the tracking of a beeper in public to
gather the same evidence observable with the naked eye, does not involve a Fourth Amend-
ment violation).
226 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment is violated when
"the Government surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it
could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house").
227 Thermal imaging, or "forward-looking infra-red" (FLIR), devices use heat differen-
tials to create a visual display of temperature conditions within a structure. These devices are
most commonly used by law enforcement to detect the presence of heat-emitting grow lamps,
which are often used to aid indoor marijuana growing operations. See Robert M. Graff, Case-
note, United States v. Robinson: Has Robinson Killed the Katz?: The Eleventh Circuit Con-
cludes that Warrantless Thermal Surveillance of a Home Does Not Constitute a Search Under
the Fourth Amendment, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 512 & n.11 (1997) (defining a FLIR device
as thermal imaging used to "detect the heat emanating from the targeted object as frequencies
within the infrared spectrum").
228 See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a FLIR
thermal imager search does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Ishmael, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995) (same);
United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Penny-Feeney,
984 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). But see United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1254
(9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "the details unveiled by a thermal imager are sufficiently 'in-
timate' to give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation"); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 594
(Wash. 1994) (holding that a warrantless FLIR search to detect marijuana production violated
the state and Federal Constitutions).
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been paid to the commonality of the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
language appearing both in the Supreme Court's constitutional gloss on
Fourth Amendment search analysis and the legislative responses to combat
paparazzi newsgathering activity.229 By applying an adaptation of the con-
stitutional and statutory "accordion phenomenon," 230 this Part concludes
that such anti-paparazzi legislation and warrantless search analysis funda-
mentally will be interrelated-one necessarily will be guided by the other
during the course of continued judicial interpretation.
A. "Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits"231
In an effort to codify constitutional norms, a lawmaking body may
choose to "utilize the language of the Constitution itself, or... the language
of judicial gloss on the Constitution ' 232 when proposing legal change. This
process of "legisprudence 233 has emerged as the preferred course of action
to reform the law, and to restore what some scholars claim to be bygone
constitutional protections through legislative, administrative, and executive
means, rather than through constitutional litigation. 234 By replicating lan-
guage from judicial opinions, a legislature creates "[s]tatutes [r]evolving in
[c]onstitutional [f]aw [o]rbits, '2 3 1 which are attempts to resolve perceived
deficiencies in the scope of constitutional rights by way of nonconstitutional
channels.
236
This legislative course may produce an economy of effort on two dis-
tinct levels: deliberation may be catalyzed "if ready-made judicial concepts
seem available and substantively attractive," and additionally, "if and when
orbiting choices are made, the corpus of law around the borrowed concept
will reduce uncertainty about the enactment's meaning.''237 Furthermore,
229 See supra notes 101-23 and accompanying text (noting the element of "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the California law and each of the congressional bills).
230 The "accordion phenomenon" describes the relationship between judicial decisions
and statutes that invoke identical constitutional language. See Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving
in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1993).
231 Id. at 1.
232 Id. at 3-4.
2 Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950) (explain-
ing the role ofjudicial law and legislative policymaking in creating legal realism).
See Lupu, supra note 230, at 2 ("[lIt has become a commonplace refrain among po-
litical progressives that law reform must arrive through legislative, administrative, and execu-
tive action rather than through constitutional litigation.").
235 Id. at 1.
236 See id. at 3-4 (discussing ways in which legislation expands constitutional protec-
tions).
237 Id, at 20.
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the invocation of judicial language "helps to minimize the risk of subse-
quent invalidation on constitutional grounds. ' 238 On the other hand, legis-
lators should be aware that "a judge-made concept may be less suited to the
legislative context than initially appears." 239 Even given the compelling
justifications for borrowing preexisting judge-made language, the fact re-
mains that "[t]he more a legislative proposal is divorced from the setting
that called forth the relevant constitutional doctrine, the greater the risk" of
unintended consequences.
240
Commentators have identified that the phenomenon of orbiting statutes
is "far more common than might be expected. 2 4 1 More importantly, the in-
clusion of judge-made language in the legislative context creates a peculiar
interplay between the legislative and judicial branches of government that
eventually may leave unsuspecting lawmakers vulnerable to the unintended
consequences of "dynamic statutory interpretation '242 by the courts.243 This
so-called "accordion" effect suggests that the ebb and flow of constitutional
interpretation by the judiciary inevitably will expand and contract the scope
of statutory application.2 44 Put differently, once a statute has been leashed
by constitutional terminology to judicial concepts, there will dwell "a ten-
sion between judicial supremacy in constitutional matters and judicial obe-
dience to legislative instructions as enacted." 245 Essentially, the court will
be torn between interpreting the statute based upon the scope of the legisla-
tive intent as construed at enactment, or allowing, over time, the "accordion
phenomenon" to reshape the law in accordance with evolving constitutional
norms.246 In the end, the "use of the judge-made language describing the
relevant concept may act as a brake on the advancement of the statutory
policy itself. '247 Furthermore, the model predicts that "as bodies of consti-
238 Id. at 22.
239 Id. at 23.
240 Id. at 23-24.
241 Id. at 5.
242 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1479 (1987) (defining dynamic statutory interpretation as that done "in light of their present
societal, political, and legal context").
243 See Lupu, supra note 230, at 25-27 (discussing the "power allocation consequences"
of drafting statutes in light of decision making).
244 See id. at 18 ("[O]rbiting statutes tethered to the Constitution's own language are vul-
nerable to the 'accordion' phenomenon .... by virtue of which the enactment may expand and
contract in conformity with changes in judicial statements of constitutional law.").
245 Id. at 26.
246 Id. at 18.
247 Id. at 26.
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tutional and statutory law begin to act reciprocally upon each other, it may
become difficult to know which is the tail and which is the dog.
' 248
B. As Goes the Press, So Goes Law Enforcement
By drafting a legislative response to intrusive newsgathering that incor-
porates the Supreme Court's well-established "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test, Congress and the California legislature have produced arche-
typal examples of Lupu's orbiting statutes.249 Indeed, members of the Cali-
fornia legislature concede that "[t]here is significant case law addressing
those circumstances under which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and under which they do not."250 This statement included in the
legislative history suggests a clear intent to couple the new anti-paparazzi
law with contemporary Fourth Amendment search analysis that courts have
entrenched in the case law.
The actual statutory language of the California law in tandem with these
comments in the legislative history thus could be viewed as a directive to
the courts that the offense of constructive invasion of privacy be defined by
the scope of Fourth Amendment "search" analysis. As a result, the consti-
tutional restrictions on surveillance by government agents become applica-
ble to private actors, not by virtue of state action doctrine, but instead from
the orbiting nature of the statute. Reasoning that an individual's "reason-
able expectation of privacy" does not turn upon whether her observer is a
private or state actor, the California legislature could have concluded that
her privacy expectations depend only upon the nature of the surveillance
activity itself and therefore are identical in either case. The judicially mim-
icked language thus enables the legislature to "extend application of consti-
tutional limits beyond state action to private activity" by adopting the same
threshold test for defining an offense.5 2
248 Id.
249 See supra notes 97-123 and accompanying text (detailing the California law and con-
gressional bills introduced in response to aggressive paparazzi newsgathering).
250 AssEMBLY COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REP. ON S.B. 262, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1998).
2 See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 230, at 9-10 (discussing hate speech codes that apply First
Amendment doctrines such as "fighting words" to rules governing private universities).
252 Id. at 4.
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1. All Bark and No Bite?
Notwithstanding the benefits of drafting orbiting language,25 3 by ex-
pressly adopting the precise text of Justice Harlan's concurrence, the Cali-
fornia law invariably is susceptible to the gushing iterations of Supreme
Court decisions that apply the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
to innovative high-tech surveillance techniques.2 54 Thus, in one sense the
legislative history reflects an intention for the Fourth Amendment "dog
255
to wag the "tail" 25 6 of the newly enacted anti-paparazzi law by using "the
U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure" as a launching pad. 5 7 On this view, the impact of new
legislation protecting against intrusive and overzealous newsgathering tech-
niques extends only as far as the waning zone of privacy applied to law en-
forcement searches of suspected illegal activity. The narrowing trend for
surveillance found offensive to the societally "reasonable expectation of
privacy" therefore suggests that liability based on this new breed of legisla-
tion is unlikely to materialize into the broad expansion of privacy protection
anticipated by its proponents.
Consider the potential impact of the new anti-paparazzi legislation on
the following contemporary example of an aggressive newsgathering tech-
nique which the law is intended to thwart: the use of helicopters to photo-
graph personal outdoor events, such as the recent backyard wedding of Bar-
bra Streisand and James Brolin in July 1998. 259 Suppose that the couple,
aggravated by the noisy disturbance during their ceremony, had been able to
bring suit against the disruptive aerial photographers by invoking the pro-
tections of the subsequently enacted California anti-paparazzi law. If the
253 See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of utilizing
constitutional law orbits).
254 See Lupu, supra note 230, at 25-26 (asserting that the problem with orbiting statutes
"is the most ubiquitous and potentially pernicious of those associated with statutory interpre-
tation of existing constitutional concepts").
255 Id. at 18.
256 Id.
257 ASSEMBLY COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REP. ON S.B. 262, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1998)
See supra notes 196-228 and accompanying text (discussing the Riley decision and its
progeny, which grant broad latitude to warrantless law enforcement searches when drug or
alcohol violations are suspected).
259 See Jeanne Beach Eigner, Public Eye, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRm., July 3, 1998, at E2,
available in 1998 WL 4018626 (documenting the "festive sounds of media helicopters" hov-
ering above the wedding); Melissa Schmitt & Lisa Van Proyen, Streisand Vows Bring Media
Crush, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 2, 1998, at N1, available in 1998 WL 3863206 (reporting that
"[u]p to 10 helicopters circled above the [neighboring] homes, with some only 100 feet above
dwellings").
ANTI-PAPARAZZILEGISLATION
state court frames the statutory "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in
accordance with contemporary Fourth Amendment case law, then the Riley
holding quickly would dispose of their cause of action. 26  As discussed
above, in that case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" from aerial surveillance by a helicopter, and the papa-
razzi victims therefore would have no cognizable claim under the new
law.
261
Thus, given the amount of Fourth Amendment "search" precedent, sub-
stantial case law would promote the view that California's anti-paparazzi
law is intended to parallel the search and seizure jurisprudence treating law
enforcement use of vision-enhancing devices.262 Applying Katz, courts
could evaluate the use of such methods in terms of whether the particular
defendant "has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy [from vision-
enhanced observation] under the circumstances of [the] case."263 Notably,
however, this "reasonable expectation" fails when the surveillance occurs in
a manner that leaves the subject's activities in plain view from lawfully
situated observers without enhancement devices.2 64 Interpreted in this way,
the application of the law strictly would be governed by prior Fourth
Amendment standards, leaving little in the way of judicial discretion. In
sum, rather than providing the broad protections from intrusion sought by
anti-paparazzi legislation advocates, the unintended consequence of the
law's narrow application would offer surprisingly little in the way of inno-
vative privacy enhancement to those in the media spotlight.
2. Wagging the Dog
As the new law and current Fourth Amendment search analysis share
identical doctrinal terms taken from current constitutional adjudication, an-
260 See supra notes 200-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Riley that held helicopter surveillance to be beyond an individual's "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy").
261 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (reasoning, in part, that "[a]ny member
of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude
of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse").
262 See, e.g., Kate Donovan Reynaga, Annotation, Observation Through Binoculars as
Constituting Unreasonable Search, 59 A.L.Rt5th 615, 625 (1998) (noting also that "[a] num-
ber ofjurisdictions have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments
directly bearing upon this subject").
263 Id. at 626.
264 See id. at 631 (noting one court's explanation that where an individual "conducts ac-
tivities ... in such a way that [the activities] are visible by means of unenhanced viewing by
persons outside the home, located where they may properly be, such observations transgress
no Fourth Amendment protection, because no intention has been exhibited by the householder
to prevent the unenhanced viewing").
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other potentially momentous, unintended consequence lurks behind the
statutory language. Consistent with Lupu's warning, the orbiting nature of
the statute might lead inescapably to correlative effects on law enforcement
surveillance. 65 Put differently, although the law contains a provision that
purports to quarantine law enforcement activities from being infected by in-
vasion of privacy convictions,266 the orbiting nature of the statutory lan-
guage ultimately could have the anti-paparazzi legislation "tail ' 267 wagging
the Fourth Amendment "dog.' 268 Because the fundamental principle moti-
vating the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is a judicial deter-
mination of societal norms,269 the enactment should be viewed as evidence
of a communal desire to strengthen individual privacy rights. Indeed, a
conviction for media observations, especially those on parallel facts to ex-
isting Fourth Amendment case law, should amount to a rejection of the Su-
preme Court's narrowed interpretation of what constitutes a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy." Once this assertion is manifested through anti-
paparazzi convictions, this heightened societal standard for personal privacy
rights should be reflected in a broadening of Fourth Amendment "search"
determinations during the course of subsequent judicial analysis under Katz.
Consider once again the helicopter surveillance of the Streisand wed-
ding by paparazzi photographers. If the courts were to depart from the con-
fines of Riley and find the media's helicopter intrusion to contravene the
statute, then the decision should be interpreted as evidence of evolving so-
cietal norms with respect to privacy rights. Because a conscientious appli-
cation of the Katz test would look to developing societal standards, even the
very enactment of the law itself ought to be viewed normatively as compel-
ling evidence of a greater societal interest in protecting an individual's right
to personal privacy against, for example, aerial surveillance.2 70 In essence,
a guilty verdict on anti-paparazzi charges ought to reflect a departure from
the reasonable expectations that existed at the time of the Riley decision,
and any future application of Katz to law enforcement helicopter surveil-
265 See supra note 248 and accompanying text ("[A]s bodies of constitutional and statu-
tory law begin to act reciprocally upon each other, it may become difficult to know which is
the tail and which is the dog.").
266 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing the law enforcement exemptions in
the California law).
267 Lupu, supra note 230, at 26.
268 Id.
269 See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text (explaining that the Katz test is based
on expectations that society deems reasonable).
2 See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Katz "expectation of
privacy" test, and noting that constitutional scrutiny is based upon a standard of societal rea-
sonableness).
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lance should take this into consideration. A faithful application of the Katz
test following an anti-paparazzi law conviction on parallel facts also would
broaden the scope of societally reasonable expectations of privacy with re-
spect to such intrusions by law enforcement.
Therefore, if the courts deviate, as they may, from established Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence when applying the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test against intrusive newsgathering, then the standard would in-
evitably produce a backlash for warrantless law enforcement surveillance.
As legislative efforts to expand a zone of personal privacy against the media
are manifested through this new cause of action, the impact on the orbiting
language of the Katz analysis necessarily follows. This fundamentally re-
ciprocal relationship between privacy and law enforcement is precisely the
reason why policymakers have hesitated to promulgate protective regula-
tions that may potentially sacrifice effective monitoring of illegal activity.27'
Proponents of privacy legislation like the California anti-paparazzi law must
not fail to recognize that innovative statutory remedies designed to fortify
privacy rights necessarily will influence the Fourth Amendment scrutiny
test under Katz, which in turn appeals to evolving societal norms for guid-
ance. Legislative expansion of privacy rights and law enforcement search
analysis thus proceeds lockstep through judicial interpretation, particularly
when drafted as such a tightly orbiting statute.272
CONCLUSION
The rapidly increasing sophistication of surveillance technology-by
private as well as state actors-has pitted our individual notions of personal
privacy against a backdrop of countervailing societal interests. With regard
to private matters, we strive to preserve a modem conception of Warren and
Brandeis's "right to be let alone, ' 273 yet society has developed a voracious
appetite for photographs and news reports that increasingly are more intru-
sive. Similarly, in the criminal context, we must balance the constitutional
protections of the Fourth Amendment guarantees against the legitimate civil
concern for effective law enforcement.
Thus, the underlying legal framework of the California anti-paparazzi
law and congressional proposals fundamentally are confused. Each borrows
language verbatim from the Supreme Court's "reasonable expectation of
271 See REGAN, supra note 20, at 16 (noting that in past legislative debates about privacy
legislation, "opponents did not challenge privacy as a value but instead focused on the impor-
tance of the competing interest.., and on the need to balance privacy against that interest").
272 See id. (identifying "the investigatory need of law enforcement officials" as personal
privaey 's "major competing interest").
27 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 193.
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privacy" test established in Katz,274 yet concurrently attempts to prevent law
enforcement from being impacted by the evolving societal norms evident in
the statutes themselves, and especially in their applications. Consequently,
examined in their totality, the orbiting nature of the legislative responses
leaves the new law and the Fourth Amendment to struggle over which is the
dog, and which is the tail. If we are to believe that the California courts
should derive their interpretation of a civil plaintiff's "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" from existing search and seizure jurisprudence, then this
cause of action inescapably is hitched to the shrinking zone of privacy es-
tablished by recent Fourth Amendment decisions. Invoking this interpreta-
tion for defining the scope of actionable claims under the statute, the Cali-
fornia legislation offers surprisingly little in the way of innovative personal
privacy protection.
If, on the other hand, the new law is to be interpreted independent of
such holdings, then the future of law enforcement surveillance in California
necessarily is vulnerable to a potentially broadening interpretation of what
constitutes an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." In the end,
the legislative backlash to intrusive newsgathering could be channeled
through the courts as a reformulated normative conception of a reasonable
zone of privacy, and this necessarily will influence the future of judicial
"search" analysis for law enforcement surveillance under Katz.
274 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra notes 183-95 and ac-
companying text (explaining that the test proposed by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is
relied on more than the majority opinion).
